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analyzes the meaning of homosexual activity. Homosexual acts are forms of 
bodily massage which share in the nature of masturbatory activity, and yet are 
more than masturbatory acts, since they do reach out to another person. They do 
not achieve, however, physical union; on the contrary, their acts lack bodily 
coadaptation and this lack of physical complementarity symbolizes the deeper 
defects on the psychological level. 
Nowhere does Boswell discuss the meaninglessness of homosexual activity: its 
sterility, lack of family history, increasing preoccupation with physical beauty, 
and ruthless competition. 
While Boswell admits the incompleteness of his study, considering its vast 
historic sweep, he does not stress sufficiently the bias of selectivity which causes 
him to single out John ·Chrysostom and Peter Damien as "hostile" opponents of 
homosexual activity. His usually scholarly approach is hardly in evidence in the 
unsuccessful way he asserts that St. Thomas played to the crowd in condemning 
homosexual acts as against nature. No documentation is provided for this posi-
tion. Nor does he show that Thomas's position broke with the past Christian 
tradition. 
The book should be read for its erudition, unfortunately marred by bias. 
- John F. Harvey, O.S.F.S. 
DeSales Hall 
Hyattsville, Md. 
How Brave a New World? 
Dilemmas in Bioethics 
Richard A. McConnick, S.J. 
Doubleday & Co., New York, N. Y., 1980. 
This is a collection of the writings of Richard A. McCormick, S.J., centering 
around the general topic of bioethics. All but one of the chapters have been pre-
viously published. The unpublished chapter deals with the question of policy 
regarding sterilization in Catholic hospitals. The collection is headed by a chapter 
devoted to general reflections about bioethics. The author then takes up the sub-
jects of proxy consent to experimentation, abortion, contraception, technological 
reproduction and genetic engineering, the preservation of life and the quality of 
life. An appendix is attached in which the author explains and defends propor-
tionalism as a moral methodology or general moral norm. 
Father McCormick allows for proxy consent to experimentation (on children) 
where the risks, pain, inconvenience, etc., are minimal. His chief opponent in th is 
issue is Paul Ramsey who argues that proxies have no authority to give consent to 
experimentation that is not in the immediate interests of the patient. On the su b-
ject of abortion, the author states that the "substance" of the traditional position 
regarding killing leads one to conclude that abortion is permissible where another 
human life or the equivalent is at stake. The author does not accept the traditional 
opinion regarding contraception and sterilization, but would allow both where 
there are serious reasons for family limitation. He suggests a hospital policy 
regarding steri lization which can be interpreted either as acceptance of steriliza-
tion or legitimate material cooperation. 
While condemning AID and IVF outside of marriage, McCormick would allow, 
at least theoretically, AIH and IVF within marriage for couples who cannot other-
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wise have children. He also extends the traditional option regarding extraordinary 
means to prolong life even to ordinary means in certain cases. More specifically, 
he does not consider what might be ordinary surgery obligatory in the case of 
infants so defective that they will never have the physical or even moral capacity 
to relate to other human beings. 
McCormick's presentations are always competent, careful and complete, but 
this reviewer does not always find them compell ing. It is impossible, in a short 
review, to discuss all the positions he takes, so we must be selective. I would tend 
to agree with his allowance of proxy consent to experimentation involving min-
imal risk , inconvenience, etc ., but I am not sure I would want to base it on a gen-
eral obligation to the common good to participate in experimentation. It would 
be difficult to establish this in individuo. I would rather say that if a competent 
person may legitimately consent to experimentation, and if competent people 
often give such consent, a proxy has reason to give this consent for an incompe-
tent patient in those situations in which a competent one would likely give it. 
I have several difficulties with the sample statement of policy on contraceptive 
sterilization. Putting the issue in terms of intervention / non-intervention in sterili-
zation procedures is somewhat misleading. It gives the impression that the hospital 
is just a bystander. The issue is not just one of non-intervention but of actuaily 
providing facilities. The hospital really provides everything but the doctor and the 
patient. This should not be overlooked in a moral assessment. Also, I do not see 
how the same statement can be an expression of both formal and material cooper-
ation, as the author states. It seems to me that these are mutually exclusive, and 
have to be if the distinction is to remain valid. I would say that the first part of 
the statement seems to involve approval (formal cooperation) if the sterilization 
contributes to the overall good of the patient. The second part of the statem ent 
sets down one of the conditions of material cooperation (refusal to cooperate will 
cause more harm than good), but in itself it is not eno\lgh. If approval to the ster-
ilization has already been given, the cooperation can no longer be simply material. 
At best, such a statement of policy would be ambiguous, and therefore confusing 
to all concerned. Finally, it is hard to see how a "policy" of continuing coopera-
tion (as this seems to be) would not gradually undermine either the hospital's 
stand against sterilization or at least its credibility in this regard. It is extremely 
difficult to keep long-term cooperation material especially when it is as compre-
hensive and as intimate as this would be. Opposition to a practice gradually turns 
into indifference and ultimately into acceptance. But even if the opposition could 
be maintained, it would be very hard to convince others that the hospital did not 
really approve the practice with which it continued to cooperate. 
The author sets down a norm for abortion which he claims represents the "su b-
stance" of the tradition regarding the morality of killing: that it is permissible 
when another life or the equivalent is at stake. Since there is a clear tradition 
which specifically deals with and condemns induced abortion , I am not sure why 
the author consults a general tradition regarding killing to solve the problem. But 
eve n if one takes this route and argues from the "substance" of the tradition 
regarding killing, I do not agree that it can be reduced to any kind of life-for-life 
(or the equivalent) equation. This simply does not do justice to the careful distinc-
tions that have been worked out in the course of history. For instance, there is no 
allowance in the tradition for taking innocent human life. If there is any equation, 
it is life for certain injustices (unjust aggresssion or certain crimes). And in the 
case of unjust aggression, there is no demand that one's life be at stake to make 
self-defense legitimate. So the substance of the tradition is not a simple life-for-life 
(or the equivalent) equation. If one follow ed the tradition, it would be permissible 
to abort the fetus only if it were an unjust -aggressor or a criminal. Since it is inno-
cent , it deserves the same respect the tradition gave to all innocent people. 
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The reader will find How Brave a New World profitabl e reading. He or she will 
also find that although the author relates the problems he discusses to Cathol ic 
tradition and teaching, he does not a lways follow the one or the other. 
- John Connery , S.J. 
Jesuit Community 
Georgetown University 
Bioethics and the Limits 0/ Science 
Sean O'Reilly 
Christendom Publications, Front Royal, Va., 1980, 174 pp. 
This is a very useful and informative book. My only quibble would be that the 
title and subtitle should be reversed: The Limits of Science (in) Bioethies. 
The large question of bioethics - life and its definition, death and its defini-
tion - are examined in close detail. There is also an appendix on in vitro fertiliza-
tion (pp. 160-169). A host of other proposals and applications in contemporary 
bioethical discussions is not taken up. I do not mention that as a criticism because 
the notion of science, scientific method and the limits of both are examined in 
detai l and that kind of disciplined reflection should precede highly detailed 
proposals and applications and it usually does not in popular reporting and con-
temporary discussions. 
The book is 10 concise chapters, basically of two parts. Dr. O'Reilly first 
defines the terms of discourse (ch. 1). Many like to contrast so-called "exact" or 
"hard" sciences with "soft" or "imprecise" science so it comes as a surprise that 
scientific data are always inexact, measurements are approximate, and generaliza-
tions known as laws are all approximations. Heisenberg's " uncertainty principle" 
means even the most precise descriptions of nature must be in terms of probabil-
ities. Faith, order, value, these are all carefully defined as is increasing entropy_ 
Chapter 2 outlines scientific achievement but notes as well the "law of limits" 
which does not detract from real scientific achievement but is an honest recog-
nition of limitation. 
Next come "What is Life?" (ch. 3) and "The Origin of Life" (ch. 4). The first 
explains, in digestible form, factors and terms that have entered common speech 
(e.g., DNA, RNA) but are not widely or really understood. 
The chapter on "The Origin of Life" is, perhaps, the most tightly reasoned in 
the book. O'Reilly poses devastating scientific questions to any theory of 
"uniformitarian evolutionism." Is creationism a scientific theory? No, not in the 
sense that science is now defined. Creationism, like evolution, can neither be 
proved nor disproved by scientific method, but unlike evolution it can be shown 
that the creation model fits all that science has discovered about matter. If Jerry 
Falwell 's people digest this chapter, there will be no stopping them' 
"The Facts of Life" (ch. 5) presents an airtight biological case that individual 
human life begins at conception. 
"The Facts of Death" (ch. 6) helps detoxify some slogans in current use along 
with a close scrutiny of the concept of "brain death." The determination of death 
in the vast majority of clinical cases is certain, "but we must emphasize that no 
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